This paper models the causes of the 2008 financial crisis together with its manifestations, using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. Our analysis is conducted on a cross-section of 85 countries; we focus on international linkages that may have allowed the crisis to spread across countries. Our model of the cross-country incidence of the crisis combines 2008 changes in real GDP, the stock market, country credit ratings, and the exchange rate. We explore the linkages between these manifestations of the crisis and a number of its possible causes from 2006 and earlier. The causes we consider are both national (such as equity market run-ups that preceded the crisis) and, critically, international financial and real linkages between countries and the epicenter of the crisis. We consider the United States to be the most natural origin of the 2008 crisis, though we also consider six alternative sources of the crisis. A country holding American securities that deteriorate in value is exposed to an American crisis through a financial channel. Similarly, a country which exports to the United States is exposed to an American downturn through a real channel. Despite the fact that we use a wide number of possible causes in a flexible statistical framework, we are unable to find strong evidence that international linkages can be clearly associated with the incidence of the crisis. In particular, countries heavily exposed to either American assets or trade seem to behave little differently than other countries; if anything, countries seem to have benefited slightly from American exposure.
Introduction
In Rose and Spiegel (2009) , hereafter "RS", we modeled the causes of the 2008 financial crisis together with its manifestations, using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. In that paper, we focused on national causes and consequences of the crisis and deliberately ignored cross-country "contagion" effects. This paper is intended to fill that gap; it empirically models various channels through which a shock that hits one or more countries might then be transmitted internationally.
We follow RS closely so as to make our results as complementary as possible. Our analysis is conducted on the same broad cross-section of countries. Our model of the incidence of the crisis is the same, combining 2008 changes in a) real GDP, b) the stock market, c) country credit ratings, and d) the exchange rate into a single measure of crisis incidence. We also control for national causes of the crisis identified by RS, dated from 2006 and earlier. These national causes are relevant parts of an early warning system if crises are country-specific in nature. They are also important if common international shocks hit a number of countries simultaneously, but a country's vulnerability to common shocks is determined by national characteristics. However, the national focus of RS is inappropriate if crises begin in one country and then spread contagiously across national borders. Accordingly, we expand our search and focus on international linkages in this paper.
We emphasize at the outset that this project has a limited scope. Two blinkers are particularly important. First, our analysis is cross-sectional in nature, and is focused deliberately on a period of time when we know there was a major financial/economic crisis that affected a large number of countries. That is, we make no attempt at all to model the timing of the crisis. We consider the latter to be a more challenging objective than ours, which is merely to determine the incidence of the 2008 crisis across countries. Success in predicting the crosssectional intensity of the crisis is a necessary condition for a useful early warning system, but is far from being sufficient. Second, with the benefit of hindsight, we do not have to model the epicenter of the 2008 crisis, a critical ingredient for any model of contagion. Though we consider a number of alternatives, it seems reasonable to model the United States as the epicenter of the 2008 financial crisis. Even strong evidence of contagion would be difficult to use in a serious early warning system, since future crises epicenters are unknown.
Literature Review

Concepts: Common Shocks vs. International Transmission of Shocks
The existence of international linkages or "contagion" in previous crises (exchange rate, banking, and financial) is controversial. The controversy begins with disagreement concerning the appropriate definition of the phenomenon. The issue is that common movements at a point in time may either be manifestations of common shocks that hit different countries differently, or shocks from one or more countries that spill out contagiously via different channels of transmission. Common shocks and contagion may be observationally similar.
However, they represent different phenomena, with radically different policy implications (for instance, "isolation" is appropriate for contagion but not common shocks).
A number of authors [e.g. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) and Edwards (2002) ] take a more narrow view of contagion. They argue that both common shocks and the international transmission of external shocks are observed in tranquil periods as well as episodes of crisis. In the tradition of epidemiological studies, "true contagion" is then a larger-than-expected effect of foreign shocks. They therefore define contagion as an exceptional increase in the magnitude of international linkages, such as the 50 percent fall in the Brazilian stock market subsequent to the collapse of the Russian ruble in 1998. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) refer to this narrower concept as "shift contagion."
Using this concept, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) find no evidence of "contagion" for a number of crises. However, they do find what they call "interdependence," the cross-country correlation of asset prices during tranquil and periods alike. Similarly, Bekaert, et al (2005) find no evidence of increases in correlations subsequent to the 1995 peso crisis, although they do find evidence after the 1997 Asian crisis. For the current crisis, Eichengreen, et al (2009) find that sensitivity to common shocks increased at the Fall 2008 volatility peaks for bank credit default swap spreads, using data for 45 large banks in Europe and the United States.
For our cross-sectional study of the 2008 crisis, examining whether correlations rise is impossible, as our sample only considers a single episode. However, it seems possible, in principle, to distinguish between country-specific sensitivity to common shocks and the country-specific contagious responses to particular foreign shocks. A country's response to a common shock seems to be a multilateral phenomena (e.g., more financially developed economies might respond to a common increase in risk aversion), while the contagious response to an individual foreign shock seems to be intrinsically bilateral (e.g., countries with more exposure to American assets might respond more to a decline in American asset prices).
In RS, we attempted to model multilateral phenomena using national data; in this paper, we focus on bilateral phenomena in our search for contagion.
Empirical Evidence on Channels of Contagion
Even if there is evidence of contagion, there are different channels of transmission through which countries can be linked. Two are of particular interest: a real channel that focuses on international trade, and a financial channel that is concerned with asset crossholdings.
Trade Linkages
Countries linked through international trade may experience contagion if their trading partners devalue their currencies. That is, strong trade linkages may encourage devaluation (or self-fulfilling expectations thereof) in response to foreign currency shocks, since countries wish to maintain external competitiveness. The basic mechanisms have been spelled out by Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Huh and Kasa (2001) . Crisis contagion can also hit economies through declines in merchandise trade [e.g. Reisen (2008) ].
Most studies in the literature stress the channel of contagion through foreign trade linkages. The intensity of trade linkages between two countries has been measured as the share of bilateral trade between the two countries in total trade [e.g. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Forbes and Chinn (2004) ]. As a form of contagion of a specific crisis, trade exposure has been measured in this manner relative to the "ground zero" country where the crisis first started, as in Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) , or in the case of a regional crisis such as the 1997 Asian crisis, the sum of bilateral exposure to the affected countries within the region, as in Baig and Goldfajn (1999) . At the firm level, Forbes (2004) measures the intensity of exposure of firms to the Russian and Asian crises of the late 1990s as a zero-one variable based on whether sales to those countries exceeded 5% of total sales.
Other measures of trade linkages in the literature look for common competitors, as in Baig and Goldfajn (1999) , who examine exposure to the United States and Japan, or Glick and Rose (1999) , Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Forbes (2002) , who measure the degree to which a country's exports compete with those of the ground zero country. For example, Forbes (2002) measures this as the product of the share of exports from the ground zero country to total global trade in that industry (a measure of the importance of the ground zero country in global trade in that industry), and the share of trade in that industry in that country's GDP (a measure of the importance of trade in that industry to the affected country).
In the case of the current crisis, the common competitor channel seems less important, as the epicenter of the crisis was the United States, an important exporter globally, but one whose export bundle and trading partners seems to be unique. It seems much more likely that the primary trade impact of the crisis was lost export opportunities, initially in the United
States, but then in other countries as they experienced their own downturns. As such, we concentrate on the exposure channel of the importance of a country as a trading partner below.
Most of the studies find evidence that trade linkages matter. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) find that trade linkages explain contagion patterns in currency crises across a group of industrial countries. Glick and Rose (1999) find that currency crises tend to be regional, supporting the notion that the importance of trade linkages affects the pattern of contagion in currency crises. Similarly, Eichengreen and Rose (1998) find that while both macroeconomic and trade channels play a role in conveying shocks internationally, trade linkages dominate. Forbes (2004) finds that firms with higher exposure to Asia and Russia experienced reduced equity returns during those countries' crises. However, Lahiri and Vegh (2003) find that central banks often actively resist devaluations during financial crises, shedding doubt on the "contagion through competitive devaluation" hypothesis.
Contagion through Foreign Asset Exposure
The most direct source of contagion on the financial side is through deterioration in a country's balance sheet because of capital losses on assets with international exposure.
International cross-holdings of assets increased substantially in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis. These cross-holdings are desirable in tranquil periods, as shocks are usually imperfectly correlated across countries, allowing international risk-sharing; Allen and Gale (2000) .
However, Allen and Gale also demonstrate that extreme shocks can lead to deterioration in balance sheet positions which can then spread across regions, the classic definition of contagion.
Exposure to contagion through this financial channel may have been exacerbated in the 2008 crisis because of the prevalence of holdings of exotic financial instruments; these were particularly vulnerable to capital losses in the wake of a general downturn. For instance, when the market price of United States asset-backed securities fell, European banks holding that paper, as well as related conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs), experienced losses.
These losses then spread to the asset-backed commercial paper market, as the institutions holding these money-losing instruments then turned to that market for funds, initiating a decline in liquidity in that market as well; see Davis (2008) . Coudert and Gex (2008) argue that credit default swap (CDS) market activity is also prone to contagion, noting that that market had seen a large rise in correlations of asset prices since August 2007. This induces investors to respond to bad news about an individual asset or market with more concern about counterparty risk of related and seemingly unrelated assets.
In a similar vein, Gros and Micossi (2008) note that many European banks found themselves exposed to foreign countries due to the activities of their affiliates on those countries. While their balance sheets were formally separate, these banks centralized their asset and liability management, ensuring that subsidiary financial difficulties would find their way to home country lending policies. 8 Vulnerability to adverse external shocks may be exacerbated due to poor balance sheet positions. For example, Davis (2008) argues that leveraged investors increase the risk of market contagion, as they may be forced to sell in illiquid situations, feeding a "fire-sale" dynamic that forces down prices further and results in the need for even more selling. Adrian and Shin (2008) argue that mark-to-market practices exacerbate the severity of the impact of changes in prices and perceived risks on market liquidity.
As measures of direct financial exposure, Forbes and Chinn (2004) use the ratio of total bank lending and foreign direct investment to a given country as a share of GDP. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) use all bilateral stocks of assets and liabilities for foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and debt, and loans, as a share of GDP.
Empirical evidence confirms the existence of "shift-contagion" in financial markets. For example, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) find an increase in the correlation on returns in Asian and Latin American equity and bond markets following the Mexican peso crisis. Similarly, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) find evidence of increased correlation in asset returns in emerging markets following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Contagious "Sudden Stops" in International Credit
A number of studies [e.g. Davis (2008) ], argue that the international interbank market may be a source of contagion and the global transmission of shocks. These markets typically lack collateral, and moral hazard is often introduced through implicit government guarantees of liquidity. This leads banks to conduct business in this market under conditions of low liquidity and poor information. As such, when credit disruptions affect particular banks, other banks often respond by rationing extensions of credit (rather than stiffening borrowing terms). The market can then seize up, with the result that international extensions of credit cease as in the Asian Financial crisis of 1997. In that crisis, weakly-capitalized Japanese banks immediately canceled credit lines of as much as 10 percent of GDP [Reisen (2008) ].
The notion that linkages may exist through mutual dependence on foreign creditors is not new. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) divide borrowing countries into one set that predominantly borrows from Japanese banks and another that predominantly borrows from American banks. They find that once a number of countries in a given cohort exhibit crisis characteristics, the unconditional probability that an unaffected country in that cohort will also fall into crisis increases dramatically. Caramazza, et al (2000) also examine exposure to a common creditor, measured as the share of a country's borrowing from the country that lent most to the ground zero country, the importance of the borrower for that creditor country, and the product of these two measures, indicating mutual importance. They confirm that exposure to a common creditor is a significant source of contagion. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) they develop and indicator of competition for funds, which measures the overall similarity between the borrowing patterns of the country in question and the ground zero country, using a methodology analogous to the measure of the intensity of trade competition with the ground zero country used in the literature cited above.
Similarly, Peek and Rosengren (1997) examine the case of the Japanese banking crisis, and find that disruptions to banking "parents" had an adverse impact on their lending through subsidiaries in the United States. They conclude that there may well be a role for contagion for financial linkages over and above that identified for trade linkages, and indeed, that some of the contagion previously identified as attributable to trade linkages may actually stem from financial linkages, as the two are highly correlated in the data. However, in practice it has proven difficult to empirically disentangle contagion due to trade linkages from that attributable to financial linkages, as countries that are closely linked in one dimension tend to also be linked in the other [e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002)].
In addition, it should be noted that not all potential crises actually metastasize into serious international financial crises. As discussed by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003), there have been a number of potentially major financial crises (such as the 1999 Brazilian devaluation and the 2001 Argentine default) that did not have dramatic international implications in practice. They note that one common distinction between cases where domestic financial crises did and did not lead to international spillovers was whether or not there were other borrowers exposed to a common leveraged creditor. These common leveraged creditors helped to foster contagion, as difficulties experienced in one borrowing country led to deteriorated bank balance sheet positions. In that sense, they reconcile the absence of contagion with a "fundamental," namely the lack of a common creditor to spread the shock internationally.
As the case of the "common competitor" channel for trade exposure, the "common creditor" channel is likely to be less relevant in the current crisis, where the downturn centered in the world's largest debtor, striking major creditors across the globe. As such, we concentrate below on the channel of financial exposure through direct holdings of foreign assets.
Finally, while the literature has been generally upbeat about the possibilities of successful early warning models, there are results that foreshadow the limited usefulness for contagion-type linkages that we search for in this paper. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) find no evidence that knowing that a single crisis is occurring somewhere in the world raises the probability of a future crisis elsewhere. However, they do find predictive power for "systemic" crises, where one-half or more of the countries studied are having a crisis, to predict an increased risk of crisis in the examined country. They conclude that the contagion relationship is "highly nonlinear" and difficult to estimate precisely.
Our reading of the literature leads to believe that contagious responses along both real and financial channels are both theoretically possible and empirically plausible. Accordingly, we now search for evidence of contagion in the 2008 crisis, using the measures suggested in the literature insofar as possible.
The Sample of Data
We are interested in examining a broad cross-section of countries and territories. 3 We wish to include all the countries that have been dramatically affected by the crisis as well as a number of other countries that have not been affected as badly (as controls). Since the incidence of the crisis was notable among high-income countries, we include all of them as well as a large number of developing countries. In particular, we examine all countries with real GDP per capita of at least $10,000 in 2003. To this set of countries, we add those with real GDP per capita of at least $4,000 and a population of at least one million. 4 After eliminating countries with missing data, we are left with a sample of 85 countries; their names are tabulated in Appendix Table A1 .
Identifying Cross-sectional Differences in Crisis Severity
Identifying the incidence of a financial crisis (currency, asset, banking, or other) across countries is no simple matter, let alone determining its severity (e.g. Berg, et al, 2004 ). Any reasonable methodology should take into account the fact that potentially serious measurement error is inherently present.
Ours is a non-structural approach. In particular, we consider four observable indicators of the crisis, and model the incidence and severity of the crisis as being a latent variable that is manifest through these variables. When measuring these manifestations of the crisis, we 8 We also use an analogue from Euromoney for sensitivity analysis. Our four measures of the consequences/manifestations of the crisis are presented for thirty countries in Table 1 , sorted by the size of the 2008 stock market decline.
Linking Incidence and Causes with the MIMIC Model
Our primary interest is in linking crisis incidence to its causes. Aigner et al (1984) and Gertler (1988) . The model consists of two sets of equations:
where: y i,j is an observation on crisis indicator j for country i, x i,k is an observation for potential crisis cause k for country i; ξ i is a latent variable representing the severity of the crisis for country i; β and γ are vectors of coefficients, and ν and ζ are well-behaved disturbances. By substituting (2) into (1), one derives a model which is no longer a function of the latent variable ξ. This MIMIC model is a system of J equations with right-hand-sides restricted to be proportional to each another. These proportionality restrictions constrain the structure to be a "one-factor" model of the latent variable; with the addition of normalization, they achieve identification of the parameters in (1) and (2). One of the features of the MIMIC model is that it explicitly incorporates measurement error about a key variable -the incidence and severity of the crisis -in a non-trivial and plausible way. Indeed, this is one of the chief attractions of the MIMIC model to us. 10 We estimate our MIMIC models in STATA with GLLAMM; Rabe-Hesketh et al (2004a, b) provide further details. The iterative estimation technique begins with adaptive quadrature which is followed by Newton-Raphson. 11 We normalize and achieve identification by imposing a factor loading of unity on the stock market change.
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In RS, we examined more than eighty possible national determinants of the crisis In Table 2 we report MIMIC estimates of γ when we include our three control variables as potential causes in (2); we use our four default indicators as measures of the crisis. We also provide sensitivity analysis in 
Contagion via International Financial Linkages
We now add each of the potential financial linkages suggested by our literature review to the default MIMIC model of Table 2 one by one, and report the estimates in Table 3 .
Throughout, we consistently retain size, income and the 2003-6 stock market rise as causes (x's). The coefficients tabulated in Table 3 are taken from our default MIMIC model augmented by the cause recorded in the extreme left-hand side; four crisis indicators are used to model ξ, while size, income, and the stock market rise are included as causes ( x 's), but not recorded so as to conserve on space. Standard errors are recorded in parentheses, and coefficients significantly different from zero at the .05 (.01) level are marked by one (two) asterisk(s).
We also include in Table 3 four other columns of sensitivity analysis. Each perturbs the methodology in some way so as to show the sensitivity of our results. The first column to the right of the default uses the Euromoney country credit ranking in place of that from Institutional Investor, while the next drops the exchange rate change as a crisis indicator. The two additional columns at the right-hand side both drop the size control (which is rarely statistically significant) and replace it with either the current account or net foreign assets, both measured as percentages of GDP.
The first row of Table 3 is the (γ) coefficient for the marginal effect of the share of foreign assets held in the United States on the latent variable of crisis incidence (ξ). 13 The coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero at the .05 level;
countries with more exposure to American financial assets seem to have experienced less intense crises. Further, this result seems to be insensitive to the exact econometric specification of the statistical model.
The result that countries with greater exposure to American assets experienced less severe crises may seem initially surprising, especially given the wide-spread chatter in the popular press about toxic American assets. However, it seems to be present in the data and is not a mere statistical illusion. Figure 1 Finally, a number of smaller countries in Europe -Iceland, Ireland, the Ukraine, and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -have also had dramatic contractions (we refer to these as the "small crisis" countries). Accordingly, the next six rows of Table 3 replace the fraction of external assets held in the United States with analogous measures for e.g., the fraction of foreign assets held in the UK (Germany, Japan, etc). However, none of these coefficients is statistically distinguishable from zero.
Thus far, we have considered only the fraction of total foreign assets held in the United States (and our other candidate epicenters). However, not all assets are created equal and the 2008 crisis is sometimes particularly closely linked with poor loans, which were often securitized and sold off as debt. Accordingly, we also consider the share of total external debt (both total and long-term debt) held in various countries; our results are again tabulated in Table 3 . Narrowing our focus to these sub-sets of external financial exposure only seems to blur the result further, though greater exposure to the United States still seems to be associated with somewhat less intense crises (as always, holding other things constant).
We explore our financial linkages further by taking advantage of a data set unique to America, the Treasury International Capital (TIC) system, which records foreign holdings of various American assets by residents of foreign countries. 15 This data set only includes
American securities, so we normalize e.g., Canadian holdings of American assets by Canadian GDP (for the CPIS data set, we are able to express Canadian holdings of American assets as a share of total external Canadian assets). However, when we add these international financial linkages to the United States to our default MIMIC model, we find only statistically weak and sensitive results; six types of American assets are included in Table 3 .
Our last pair of financial linkages is taken from the World Bank's Global Development
Finance data set. Both refer to the currency composition of public and publicly-guaranteed (PPG) debt; we have shares of PPG debt denominated in both yen and US$. We try both of these series in the final rows of Table 3 . The higher the share of debt denominated in yen, the more intense the crisis seems to be, though this result is not usually different from zero at standard levels of statistical significance. By way of contrast, countries with higher fractions of dollar debt had less intense crises. 16 
Trade Linkages
The evidence presented in Table 3 covers a number of different financial channels that might link the epicenter of the 2008 crisis to other countries. But the channel through which the crisis was transmitted might have been real, not financial. Accordingly, we now search for evidence that the channel for contagion was real, and can be measured through bilateral trade exposure. Table 4 is an analogue to Table 3 but examines trade linkages instead of financial linkages. Specifically, we include the fraction of total 2006 exports that a country sends to the United States as a fraction of its total exports. Canada, Mexico, and Haiti each sent over 80% of their exports to the United States while Cyprus, Qatar, and Macedonia sent less than 1% of their exports to America. 18 The former three countries might logically have expected their trade to suffer more than the latter in the event of an American recession. Does this measure of export vulnerability help explain relative crisis performance? The results in the top row indicate that the answer is affirmative; greater export dependence on the United States leads systematically to less intense financial disruptions. Figure 3 provides the relevant graphical evidence, scattering the four crisis manifestations against export dependence on America. This relationship does not characterize other potential epicenters of the crisis; there is no systematic strong evidence that export dependence on any except the small crisis countries matters.
However, countries with substantial exports to the small crisis countries -especially those in the Baltics -are systematically associated with more intense crises. 
Including both Real and Financial Linkages Simultaneously
Thus far, the analysis has focused on searching for a single transmission channel for international crisis contagion. However, there may be more than one channel in which a crisis can spread contagiously. Accordingly we include a number of different transmission mechanisms simultaneously in Table 5 .
In Table 5a , we tabulate coefficient estimates for a number of different causes which we Table 5b is the analogue   to Table 5a in every way, but substitutes trade with America in place of exports to America.
The results in Table 5 are weak; almost none of the channels for contagion seem to have statistically discernible effects on crisis intensity. The only exception is the real channel to the United States; countries that proportionately either exported more to or (especially) traded more with the United States in 2006 experienced less severe 2008 crises. However, there is little evidence of contagion spreading through a financial channel.
Summary and Conclusion
In this short paper, we model the causes of the international financial crisis that hit much of the world in 2008 . We use a flexible econometric methodology which takes into account the facts that the intensity of the crisis varies across countries, is only imperfectly measured, and may have multiple causes and manifestations. We rely on our previous work to model the national causes of the crisis, using data from 2006 and earlier. Above and beyond these national causes, we search for evidence that the 2008 financial crisis spread contagiously from the United States to other countries, via a number of both financial and real channels that might have transmitted the crisis from its epicenter. While we believe that it is natural to model the origins of the crisis as American, we also test for six other potential epicenters.
Despite our broad-ranging search, we are unable to find strong evidence of contagion.
Indeed, countries that were more exposed to the United States --those that held disproportionate amounts of American securities or depended heavily on exports to the United States -seem if anything to have experienced smaller crises, holding other factors constant.
Overall though, we find remarkably little evidence that the intensity of the crisis across countries can be easily modeled using quantitative techniques and standard data that is either country-specific or links countries to the source of the crisis. This negative finding in the crosssection is powerful since we know, with the benefit of hindsight, both the approximate timing and the epicenter of the 2008 crisis. It makes us skeptical of the ability of "early warning systems" which must be able to predict the incidence of future crises across both countries and time. .37 (3.99) .95 (3.97) .87 (4.14) 
